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Comments and Casenotes
Best Evidence Rule - Unsigned Carbon Copy
Of Letter As Duplicate Original
Parr Construction Co. v. Pomer'
The plaintiff Construction Company brought suit against
the defendant Construction Company and its president to
recover the balance due under an oral contract to perform
certain excavation work at a price of thirty-five cents per
cubic yard, being unable to agree as to the actual quantity
which plaintiff had excavated. The defendant engineer
estimated 12,673 cubic yards, whereas the plaintiff esti-
mated 18,000 cubic yards. The plaintiff agreed with the
defendant to refer the dispute to one Matz as an impartial
arbitrator.
The issue here in question concerns the admissibility
in behalf of the plaintiff of an unsigned carbon copy of a
letter from Matz to the defendant giving Matz's estimate
of the quantity of earth excavated as 14,340 cubic yards.
After a previous effort to introduce the copy into evidence,
the plaintiff called the defendant's president as a witness
and had him identify the carbon copy as a copy of the
letter received by him. The defendant objected to the ad-
mission of the copy on two grounds: first, that it violated
the best evidence rule; and second, because the arbitrator
was not present to testify as a witness and explain the
method used in making his calculation.' The trial court
overruled the defendant's objections and admitted the letter
into evidence. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial
court said:
"The objection based on the best evidence rule is
without merit. (Defendant's president) was called as
a witness by (the plaintiff) and identified the unsigned
carbon copy as a copy of the original letter received
by him. * * * A carbon copy of a letter is considered
to be a duplicate original; and, as such, it constitutes
primary rather than secondary evidence. '3
The court appears to have based its holding upon two
alternative grounds: (1) that the unsigned carbon copy
1217 Md. 539, 144 A. 2d 69 (1958).
2 Only the first objection, in regard to the best evidence rule, falls within
the scope of this note.
8Supra, n. 1, 542.
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was admissible as a duplicate original; and (2) that the
defendant's president had admitted that the carbon copy
was accurate and authentic.
In general terms, the Best Evidence Rule is one requir-
ing the production of the best evidence obtainable in ac-
cordance with the nature of the case.4 As it exists today,
the rule applies only where writings are offered in evi-
dence,' and so McCormick states the rule to be that:
"[I]n proving the terms of a writing, where such
terms are material, the original writing must be pro-
duced, unless it is shown to be unavailable for some
reason other than the serious fault of the proponent."
Following the view expressed by this rule, the original
document or writing is admitted as primary evidence of the
terms contained therein, and any other evidence, unless
given the status of a duplicate original, is considered to be
secondary evidence.7 The instant case appears to expand
the duplicate original rule to include unsigned carbon
copies.
At the inception of the original document rule, the most
reliable method of reproduction was hand copying." There-
fore, all copies were susceptible to the possibility of human
error and production of the original document was strictly
required.9 However, with the advent of modern machine
reproduction methods, the courts have been faced with the
problem of determining what methods of reproduction will
create documents that can be considered duplicate originals
'TtAyE, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAw, 489
(1898); 3 'BLcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, (1765) 368; MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE,
(1954), 408, § 195.
'McCoRMICK, op. cit., ibid., 409.
0 Ibid.7 Primary evidence is the best evidence obtainable and secondary evidence
is that which may be admitted in the absence of the best evidence only
when a satisfactory excuse for such absence has been given. Anglo-Ameri-
can Packing and Provision Co. v. Cannon, 31 F. 313 (C.C.A. Ga., 1887);
U.S. v. Reyburn, 31 U.S. 352 (1832). It is noted that in most American
jurisdictions there exist certain preferences in secondary evidence where
such is admissible. The problem of preference among various kinds of
secondary evidence is outside the scope of this note. It Is involved in
Robinson v. Singerly Pulp Co., 110 Md. 382, 72 A. 828 (1909). For a more
complete discussion see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 1265-1280;
2 JoNEs, EvDEN CE, §§ 859-862 (2d ed. rev. 1926); McCoRMICK, EVIDEN E
(1954), 421, § 207; Note, Degrees of Secondary Evidence, 38 Mich. L. Rev.
864 (1940).
8 For detailed historical development see 4 WIOMoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed.
1940) §§ 1177-1179, 1 JONES, EVIDENcE (4th ed. 1938) § 209.
'A party claiming a right resting upon a document was required to
produce the document or lose his claim. Thomas of Utred v. Anon, Y.B. 24
ed. III, fol. 24, P1. 1 (1350).
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and be admissible as primary evidence. Due to their vary-
ing degrees of reliability, letterpress copies ° and photo-
graphic copies" have been generally held to be secondary
evidence and inadmissible without accounting for the orig-
inal, whereas printing press copies are uniformly held to
be duplicate originals, and, as such, primary evidence if
printed from the same type at the same time. 2
The holdings are not so well-defined in the case of car-
bon copies. It is generally stated that for such a copy to
be given the status of a duplicate original, the writer must
have so intended." As a corollary, it has often been indi-
cated that such intent cannot be found unless the copy
is signed as well as the original. 4 Recognizing these views
McCormick, in discussing the use of carbon copies, says:
"... Here the copy is made by the same stroke of
the pen or pencil as the original, and there is an analogy
to the practice of signing counterparts where each copy
was intended to be an equal embodiment of the con-
tract or other transaction. Indeed, today counterparts
usually consist of an original and one or more carbon
copies, all duly signed in multiplicate. What makes
them counterparts is the signing with intent to make
them equal."' 5
However, it cannot be said that the majority of courts
require that the copies be counterparts in the manner indi-
cated by McCormick, since many courts have admitted
copies without making any mention as to whether they are
signed or not." It may well be that they were, but none-
10 Marsh v. Hand, 35 Md. 123, 127 (1871) ; Spottiswood v. Weir, 66 Cal.
525, 6 Pac. 381 (1885) ; Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. F. W. Stock and
Sons, 104 Va. 97, 51 S.E. 161 (1905) ; Westinghouse Co. v. Tilden, 56 Neb.
129, 76 N.W. 416 (1898). Cf. McAuley v. Siscoe, -110 Kan. 804, 205 P. 346,
347 (1922), which appears to express a more liberal view.
n Hensel v. Smith, 152 Md. 380, 136 A. 900 (1927) ; Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co. v. Mendenhall, 183 Ark. 25, 34 S.W. 2d 1078 (1931) ; Cohen v. Elias,
163 N.Y.S. 1051, 176 App. Div. 763 (1917).
12People v. Chicago R.I. and P.R. 0o., 329 Ill. 467, 160 N.E. 841 (1928).
'2cCnOMIcK, 8upra, n. 4, 419-420, § 206; Lockwood v. L. & L. Freight
Lines, 126 Fla. 474, 171 So. 236 (1936) ; McDonald v. Hanks, 52 Tex. Civ.
App., 140, 113 S.W. 604 (1908).
1" Oberlin v. Pyle, 114 Ind. App. 21, 49 N.E. 2d 970, 972 (1943) ; Inter-
national Harvester Co. of America v. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N.W.
252 (1907) ; Chrismer v. Chrismer, 103 Ohio App. 23, 144 N.E. 2d, 494, 499
(1956) ; Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559, 562, 59 A. 2d 325 (1947) ; Lockwood
v. L. & L. Freight Lines, supra, n. 13.15 McCoRMICK, supra, n. 4, 419-420.
16 Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. State, 82 Ind. App. 377, 149 N.E.
377, 384 (1925) ; Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 238 Ky.
322, 37 S.W. 2d 856 (1931) ; Carter v. Carl Merveldt & Son, 183 0kla. 152,
80 P. 2d 254 (1938) ; Totten v. Bucy, 57 Md. 446 (1882) ; Goodman v. Saper-
stein, 115 Md. 678, 81 A. 695 (1911) ;'See also 65 A.L.R. 2d 342, 355 (1959).
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theless the courts have not all drawn the distinction; some
seem only to require that the copies be created simul-
taneously. 7
The Maryland court has unquestionably given the car-
bon copies which have come before it the status of duplicate
originals. 8 The leading Maryland case on point, Goodman
v. Saperstein,9 disposed of the question by stating:
"Proof was given by the witness ... of the mailing of
the originals.., and carbon copies of such letters when
their custody is properly proven are regarded as dupli-
cate originals. ' 20
It is noted that in so holding the court made no mention
as to whether the copies were signed or not, which might
indicate that the court did not feel that the question of
signing was important.
In support of its holding, the court cited International
Harvester Co. v. Elfstrom2' where the duplicate copy was
signed, the signature being reproduced by the carbon pro-
cess. In the Harvester case the document in question was
a contract executed in duplicate by means of carbon paper.
In holding the carbon copy to be primary evidence, the
Court said:
"If the reproduction is complete there is no practical
reason why all the products of the single act of writ-
ing a contract and affixing a signature thereto should
not be regarded as of equal and equivalent value. In
this instance the same stroke of the pen produced both
signatures."22
Furthermore, in Totten v. Bucy,23 which was decided prior
to the Goodman case, the duplicate had been expressly
designated as a "duplicate", and in the more recent case
of Morrow v. State 4 the duplicate was signed. Although
prior to the instant case the Maryland court had not ex-
pressly made a distinction between signed or copies other-
wise indicating that they were intended to be duplicate
17Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Dickenson, 247 Ill. 27, 93 N.E. 132 (1910);
Oberlin v. Pyle, 114 Ind. App. 21, 49 N.E. 2d 970 (1943) ; 51 A.L.R. 1498,
65 A.L.R. 2d 342, 355-356 (1959).
's Morrow v. State, 190 Md. 559, 59 A. 2d 325 (1948) ; Totten v. Bucy, 57
Md. 446 (1882) ; Goodman v. Slaperstein, 115 Md. 678, 81 A. 695 (1911) ;
Parr Construction Co. v. Pomer, 217 Md. 539, 144 A. 2d 69 (1958); 65
A.L.R. 2d 342, 356 (1959).
"Supra, n. 18.
-oIbid., 683.
21 101 Minn. 263, 112 N.W. 252 (1907).
-Ibid., 264.
2 Supra, n. 18.
Supra, n. 18.
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originals and unsigned copies or mere file copies, the con-
clusion could have been drawn that the copies had to show
the writer's intent that they be treated as duplicate orig-
inals. However, the court in the principal case indicated
that an unsigned carbon copy constitutes a duplicate orig-
inal. It cannot be said that such was the clear holding of
the court, since an alternative ground for admitting the
letter from the arbitrator was also indicated, and no clear
statement was made as to which ground was actually the
basis for the opinion.
As an alternative to admitting the letter as a duplicate
original, the court indicated that the policy of the best evi-
dence rule was satisfied by the defendant's president ad-
mitting on the witness stand that the paper offered was
a copy of the original, without suggesting that it was in-
accurate in any way. In such circumstances the policy of
the best evidence rule is satisfied.
The leading case on this point is Slatterie v. Pooley5
where it is stated:
"If such evidence were inadmissible, the difficulties
thrown in the way of almost every trial would be in-
superable. The reason why such parole statements are
admissible ... is that they are not open to the same
objection which belongs to parole evidence from other
sources where the written evidence might have been
produced; for such evidence is excluded from the pre-
sumption of its untruth arising from the very nature
of the case where better evidence is withheld; whereas
what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably
be presumed to be so." '2 6
It is noted that this case involved an out of court admis-
sion, but that the Maryland Court of Appeals has expressly
adopted the rule of the case in regard to admissions made
both in and out of court." Although the majority of juris-
dictions have fully adopted the rule,28 there are numerous
holdings in which the principle had been repudiated, but
usually only in respect to oral admissions made out of
court.2 9 While it is true that there may be valid objections
26 M. and W. 664, 151 Eng. Rep. 579 (1840).
Ibid., 664.
1 Marine Bank v. Stirling, 115 Md. 90, 80 A. 736 (1911).
28 Fontenot v. Lloyds Casualty Insurer, 31 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 1947);
Haas v. Storner, 47 N.Y.S. 1100 (1897) ; Norcum v. Savage, 140 N.C. 472,
53 S.E. 289 (1906) ; Gardiner v. City of Columbia Police Dept., 216 S.C. 219,
57 S.E. 2d 308 (1950).
",Plunkett v. Dillon, 4 Del. Ch. 198 (1871); Haliburton v. Fletcher, 22
Ark. 453 (1861) ; Swing v. Cloquet Lumber Co., 121 Minn. 221, 141 N.W.
117 (1913).
[VOL. XX
1960] PARR CONSTRUCTION CO. v. POMER 55
to dispensing with production in cases where the admission
has been made out of court, 0 there seems to be no logical
basis for requiring production when the admission of the
party or his authorized agent is made from the witness
stand.
In Maurice v. Worden8l the action was for libel, the
statements in question being endorsed upon a written
resignation submitted by the plaintiff to the defendant as
Commandant of the United States Naval Academy. It was
necessary to prove this libelous endorsement made by the
defendant in order to sustain the action. The original docu-
ment was not available and the plaintiff offered to prove
the endorsement by an oral admission which had been
made by the defendant to the wife of the plaintiff. The
lower court refused to admit the testimony of the wife to
this effect. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision,
said:
"This evidence is not secondary but comes within
the class of primary evidence. The admissions of a
party freely and voluntarily made, are always evi-
dence, which may be introduced by the opposite
r32ty "82
This holding was followed in Marine Bank v. Stirling."8
In this case the admission was made from the witness stand.
The plaintiff attempted to introduce a newspaper contain-
ing a published report of the condition of the defendant
bank. The president of the bank testified that he did not
have the original report, but identified the newspaper as
a copy of the report. The court disposed of the defendant's
contention that the report was inadmissible as a copy,
stating:
". .. it would be difficult to prove the authenticity
of a statement so published in a more definite way than
was done in this case - being proved by the president
who attested it. It cannot be said that such a publica-
tion is a copy in the sense that there is an original
which must be produced instead of the copy .... .34
See WIOMORE, op. cit., supra, n. 3, § 1255.
8'54 Md. 233, 258 (1880).
0Ibid., 256, citing Slatterle v. Pooley, supra, n. 25; Loomis v. Waldhams,
8 Gray 557, 562 (1857) ; Smith v. Palmer, 6 Cush. 513, 520 (1850), in which
the court said:
"A party's own statements and admissions are in all cases admissible
in evidence against him, thbugh such statements and admissions may





The rule is apparently well settled in Maryland that
such an admission to the content of a writing will serve to
dispense with the production of the original. In the case
at hand the president of the defendant corporation appar-
ently identified the carbon copy as an accurate reproduc-
tion of the letter received by him. On this ground alone,
under the rule of Slatterie v. Pooley,85 as adopted by the
Maryland Court, the copy was clearly admissible. There
is a third line of reasoning which might have been applied
to the facts of the subject case. The fundamental purpose
of the best evidence rule has confined its application to
the proof of the terms of a writing when the dispute is
about what those terms are. Some courts have held that
the rule does not operate to bar evidence of a transaction
merely because a written memorandum exists, unless that
memorandum, as opposed to the transaction, is the thing
which itself is to be proved.
The leading case illustrating this distinction is Herzig
v. Swift and Co."8 In this case action was brought under
the Florida wrongful death statute by the administratrix
of a deceased partner for a partnership accounting. In
proving damages the plaintiff offered the testimony of one
of the surviving partners as to the amount of partnership
earnings. This testimony was rejected by the trial court
on the basis of the best evidence rule, the books of the firm
being thought to be the best evidence of its earnings.
This ruling was reversed on appeal. The court, citing
numerous authorities in support of its holding, stated:
"Here there was no attempt to prove the contents
of a writing; the issue was the earnings of the partner-
ship, which for convenience were recorded in the books
of account after the relevant facts occurred. Generally
this differentiation has been adopted by the courts....
The federal courts have generally adopted the rationale
limiting the 'best evidence rule' to cases where the
contents of the writing are to be proved."8 7
The distinction has been recognized by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in several instances.8s Perhaps the
strongest case on the point is Cramer v. Shriner.39 Here the
Supra, n. 25.
146 F. 2d 444 (1945).
Ibid., 446.
"Glenn v. Rogers, 3 Md. 312 (1852); Cramer v. Shriner, 18 Md. 140
(1861) ; Beall v. Poole, 27 Md. 645 (1867).
SSupra, n. 38.
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plaintiff offered to prove solely by testimony that a settle-
ment of all accounts between defendant and himself had
taken place on a certain day in the presence of the witness.
The witness testified that the settlement was based on
figures contained in a memorandum which was in posses-
sion of the plaintiff at the time of settlement. Although the
witness saw the memo he had no knowledge of its contents
and his testimony was based entirely upon the declarations
of the parties made to each other in his presence. Defen-
dant objected to any parole evidence of the amounts and
items of settlement contained in the memo without pro-
duction of the memo or proof of its loss. The trial judge
admitted the testimony over defendant's objection. This
ruling was affirmed on appeal. The Court citing Glenn v.
Rogers," stated:
"According to our construction of this exception, it
presents the single question, whether it was competent
for the witness, Titlow, to testify as to the settlement
made between the parties, without the production of
the memorandum used by them in the course of the
settlement.... The testimony was not offered to prove
the contents of the memorandum, but to prove a settle-
ment for the wheat included in defendants receipts,
and it does not seem to be objectionable, on the ground
that it tended to prove the contents of the memorandum
as material to the plaintiff's case.
"It is difficult to see how the non-production of the
memorandum, at the trial could render the testimony
of Titlow, as to the settlement and its subject matter,
derived from the declarations and admissions of the
parties to each other, inadmissible. * * * Facts are
sometimes proved by parole of which there is evidence
in writing."'"
In Grey v. State4 oral testimony of a confession which
had been reduced to writing and signed by the defendant
was rejected by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the
best evidence rule. Such a decision might appear to in-
volve a repudiation of the prior rule, but it is believed
that there are grounds for special treatment of confessions.
In a sense, a confession reduced to writing may be com-
pared to a written integrated contract; the oral proceed-
Supra, n. 38.
'
1 Supra, n. 39, 146, 147.
181 Md. 439, 30 A. 2d 744 (1943).
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ing may be regarded as preliminary matter superseded by
the writing. We want to show the contents of the writing
for its own sake. We are dealing with an original which
is a writing. The desire for precision in what may be a
matter of great length, and of great importance, and the
suspicion which arises when the prosecution in a criminal
case does not produce such a writing may also explain the
decision in the Grey case.43
The distinction between evidence of the contents of a
writing and evidence of other facts which happen to have
been written down, has thus been recognized by the Mary-
land Courts as well as other reliable authorities."' This
ground alone would have provided sufficient basis for the
admission of the unsigned carbon in the instant case with-
out resort to the duplicate original doctrine. Although not
admissible to prove the contents of the original letter the
copy could certainly be admitted as other evidence of the
facts in issue, i.e. the findings of the arbitrator. The fact
that the arbitrator had written down these findings in the
original letter should not bar any other evidence of the
arbitration agreement or its result. 5
It is difficult to say whether the instant case constitutes
authority for the future admission in evidence of unsigned
carbon copies where there is no admission of their accuracy.
The opinion of the court, when read along with the cases it
cites, seems to adopt alternative grounds for admitting the
letter. It would have been clearer if the court had merely
adopted the second alternative, or have admitted it as addi-
tional evidence of the terms of the arbitration agreement.
ROBERT E. POWELL
J. WILLIM SCHNEER, JR.
For decisions contra, see: Alexander v. State, 37 Ala. App. 533, 71 So. 2d
520 (1954) ; State v. Bruni, 79 R.I. 311, 88 A. 2d 162 (1952).
"WIOMoRE, op. cit., supra, n. 7, § 1242; MoKELvY, EVIDENCE (5th ed.
1944) § 345; A.L.R. MODEL ConE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 602 (4).
,5 If the decision of the arbitrator, and not his letter reporting that
decision, is the original, however, the court could not have aIvoided a
hearsay problem. Any letter would then be admissible only to prove the
truth of its contents - that the arbitrator had decided that the quantity
was 14,340 tons. Since Matz was not produced for cross-examination, the
letter is hearsay. If the letter itself is regarded as the decision, there is
no hearsay problem in proving what the decision was, if the letter or a
"duplicate original" is produced. However, it is probably unrealistic to
regard the letter as the decision of the arbitrator in the sense that a court
judgment "Is" the decision of the court. It does not appear to be something
which itself creates a legal relationship and thus escapes the hearsay rule
as an operative fact. See McConmici, op. cit., supra, n. 7, § 228.
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